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RAYMOND AARON YOUNIS
The University of Notre Dame (Sydney)
Patrick McNamara: The Neuroscience of Religious Experience. Cambridge 
University Press 2009.
The emerging literature on neuroscience and religious experience is 
thought-provoking, to say the least, and may well revolutionize our under-
standing of religious experience. The focus in this review will be on religious 
experiences and the relevant neuroscientific structures and processes, as well 
as the central claims made about religious experience itself and its relation-
ship with such structures and processes; important work in the book on the 
‘self ’, practices and rituals, various concepts of God, ecstatic states and so 
on, and the things that may be external to, or follow or flow from, religious 
experience, will not be the focus of this review, due to necessary restrictions 
on length.
McNamara argues that religious experience highlights the relationship 
between oneself and God: ‘self and God are intimately connected at the cog-
nitive and psychological levels’ and the ‘level of experience can be measured 
to some extent by looking at brain and cognitive mediation of religious expe-
rience’ (p. 80). If this is correct, and if religious experience can be understood 
in terms of this kind of relationship, then neuroscience might illuminate the 
nature of this relationship. Moreover, if certain regions of the brain are ‘impli-
cated’ in religious experience, then one might find some clues about the func-
tions of religious experience also (p. 81). Now much depends on the question 
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that is being addressed here. For example, is the highlighting of this relation-
ship an answer to the question of what religious experience is (the nature of re-
ligious experience) or an answer to the question of what comprises religious ex-
perience or an answer to the question of the functions of religious experience. 
Much depends too on what implicated means; if religious experience involves 
brain (neural) processes and some thinking, and if brain regions are implicated 
in thinking, then these regions of the brain will be implicated in religious expe-
rience, to some extent. But what would be true of the neural processes associ-
ated with thinking would not necessarily be true of the religious experience as 
a whole, since it is an experience that a person reports (not merely an act or 
process of thinking). Attention to potentially tricky language is crucial.
A number of cases are presented. The suggestion is that the right prefrontal 
and temporal lobes are ‘indeed involved in religious expression’ (pp. 87-88). 
This may be true. But there is some ambiguity again: ‘involved’ in what sense? 
(Thinking is a part of religious experience as a whole, possibly, in so far as neu-
ral and brain structures are associated with thinking and inasmuch as thinking 
occurs at some stage in a religious experience; but even so, a religious experi-
ence is not the same thing, logically or empirically, as ‘religious expression’.) So 
what is true of ‘religious expression’ (such as someone uttering the words, ‘I 
love God and God loves me!’) need not be necessarily true of ‘religious experi-
ence’, as an experience of this kind often goes well beyond mere ‘expression’.
McNamara argues that ‘the sense of Self, language meanings, and abstract 
visual analysis are all handled by the same region of the neocortical networks 
that gives rise to religious experience’ (p. 88). So it would seem that our sense 
of who we are, the things we say and mean when we speak about this, and ‘ab-
stract visual analysis’ correspond with ( the meaning of ‘handled’ is not entirely 
clear here) ‘the same region’ that ‘gives rise’ to religious experience. But in what 
sense does this region ‘give rise’ to an experience, let alone a religious one?
If ‘gives rise’ means ‘causes’ then there seems to be a confusion here be-
tween the cause of an experience in a subject (which is religious) and a cause of 
some kind of signalling and processing in relation to the thought processes that 
may occur when the subject is having the experience itself, if one grants that 
such an experience can be a genuine one. However, it is difficult to see how ob-
serving increased oxygenation or activation in certain brain regions or neural 
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circuits can show that the signalling and processing are actually, and on their 
own, ‘giving rise’ to the experience itself.
The problem here is the slipperiness of ‘experience’ which the book rarely, 
if ever, slows; ‘experience’ normally means encountering or seeing or hearing or 
perceiving (and so on) something, such as an external object or phenomenon 
(of course not all religious experiences are like this, but many are, especially 
in the Judaeo-Christian tradition); the fact that one is having such an experi-
ence then does not necessarily mean that neural processes and structures in 
the brain alone are ‘giving rise’ to religious experience, and certainly not in the 
sense of generating the religious experience, for the imaging technologies do 
not actually show this relation in any kind of obvious or clear way. The observer, 
to be sure, does not see one thing giving rise to another thing (that is, a religious 
experience) in this context; what the neuroscientist sees is a pattern of oxygena-
tion or activation (and other such things) for example, in a region of the brain, 
and then interprets the correlation or correspondence in a certain (pun not 
intended!) kind of way.
But the precise nature and meaning of the correlation or correspondence is 
open to more than one interpretation. One cannot deduce from the existence 
of such a correlation or correspondence that neural signalling and processing, 
and only these, are causing or creating (‘giving rise’ to) religious experience. A 
lot more care needs to be taken with the inferential and interpretive steps here 
in order to avoid leaping to unjustified conclusions. It is important to be more 
precise and clear at this stage.
McNamara argues that ‘the literature on TLE-related religiosity gives us 
an initial clue as to brain circuits that normally handle religious material — 
namely, the right sided temporal and prefrontal networks as it is these net-
works that attach religious concepts to the impulses originating in the amyg-
dala’ (p. 93). This may be true but there are significant problems. The question 
of who, or what, ‘attaches’ concepts to impulses needs to be explained clearly. 
One might argue that it is the thinking, reflective subject who ‘attaches’ con-
cepts to things, or better, employs concepts to make sense of things, even if 
this is not the whole story about the relation between concepts and impulses 
or, better, perceptions and more broadly, experience (consider these three 
difficulties: what do our observations tell us about the connection between 
impulses and concepts in certain networks in the brain, how exactly does a 
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network in the brain ‘attach’ a ‘concept’ to an ‘impulse’, and what sorts of ob-
servations would show this to be the actual process, and the only one or the 
main one in terms of religious experience?)
McNamara makes an analogous claim: he notes ‘the extent and role of 
the hippocampus and the amygdale in creating religious content’ (p. 93). This 
is ambiguous; it suggests either that these structures are crucial in ‘creating 
religious content’ (emphasis added) or that they are primarily responsible in 
some sense for ‘creating’ such content. But it is not clear what the relation is 
between ‘religious content’ and ‘religious experience’ (the former could con-
ceivably go well beyond the latter). The question of what ‘creates religious 
content’ is also unclear: religious experience is ‘created’ in the sense, perhaps, 
of being brought into being by the unfolding relation between a subject, gen-
erally conscious, an event or an encounter (or some such thing) and a grasp 
or an understanding of this relation, as well as (conceivably) a change in one’s 
understanding. It is difficult to see how all of this (and more!) can be account-
ed for only in relation to brain structures and circuits, and neural phenom-
ena. So an important question arises: are the amygdale and hippocampus ac-
tive because they are ‘creating’ religious content or are they active because 
‘religious content’ of some kind is a part of the subject’s unfolding (religious) 
experience and thinking, or indeed, because (for the purposes of argument) 
an experience of a religious kind is taking place? In our observations, do these 
structures and their activation correlate with the unfolding of an experience 
of this kind? This question is not an insignificant one.
McNamara is refreshingly open about the fact that the issue here is ‘hy-
perreligiousness’ and in ‘patients’ with ‘brain disorders’ (p. 105). After con-
sidering religious delusions, mania and so on, McNamara concludes that the 
limbic system and other structures (for example, parts of the basal ganglia 
and prefrontal cortex) are ‘the crucial nodes in a brain circuit that mediates 
religiosity’ (p. 105). There is no attempt here to link rigorously the phenom-
ena of hyperreligiousness associated with some brain disorders, on the one 
hand, with the phenomena and content of religious experience more general-
ly, which is reported not by patients or by subjects with brain disorders; there 
is no necessary logical or empirical identity between a patient suffering from 
a neurodegenerative disease and delusions (who reports having a religious 
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experience) and a person whose brain functions and circuits are functioning 
normally, and who reports a religious experience.
A similar question arises a little later. Though it may be true, as McNa-
mara argues (p. 105), that when this circuit ‘is stimulated in the right way, 
you get religious ecstasy’ nonetheless the implied analogy between religious 
experience and religious ecstasy is not demonstrated. So, when the ‘circuit 
is overactivated, you get various forms of religiously tinged aberrations’ and 
‘when limbic and basal ganglia sites play the leading role, you get changes 
in ritual behaviors as well as increased interest in religious practices such as 
prayer and other rituals’ (p. 106). There is at least one question that arises and 
it does seem to be part of an emerging but problematic picture: ‘religiously 
tinged aberrations’, ‘changes in ritual behaviours’, ‘prayer and other rituals’ are 
not necessary parts of religious experience. To his credit, McNamara seems 
to be aware of some of the limits here: ‘beyond this meager summation, little 
more can be said with any degree of confidence’ (p. 106). Indeed.
McNamara then turns to ‘healthy’ individuals. He discusses functional 
imaging techniques (SPECT, PET, fMRI and so on) and the study of brain 
function in ‘normal, living humans’ so they might shed further light on ‘phe-
nomena considered unique to human beings, like religious behaviours’ (p. 
107). The studies ‘converge on the conclusion that the circuit of brain sites 
that we identified as crucial for religiosity from the clinical data (orbitofron-
tal, right temporal, limbic system… the serotonin and dopamine systems, 
etc.) also appear consistently in the neuroimaging findings of healthy per-
sons performing religious practices. This is a remarkable fact’ (p. 127). Such 
structures ‘all appear to undergo increased levels of activation during the re-
ligious practice’ (p. 127). One can see why this ‘fact’ seems to be ‘remarkable’, 
though it should be noted that the ‘fact’ concerns ‘religiosity’ and ‘practice’, a 
very broad set of terms, and not specifically, religious experience. One would 
indeed expect activation levels to increase if one is practicing something in-
tently and one’s brain circuits are functional (for example, a ritual). But what 
needs to be established is that such practicing is necessarily related to, and is 
a necessary part of the nature of, religious experience.
McNamara offers a welcome ‘tentative synthesis’ (p. 127). He claims that 
‘there is a network of brain regions that consistently are activated when a 
person performs a religious act’ (p. 127). There is a ‘circuit that mediates reli-
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giousness’ and McNamara seems to think that there is a correlation between 
this kind of work and the work of authors who study ‘potential brain cor-
relates of religiosity’ (p. 129). Their work is based on an ‘impressive’ body of 
data on ‘temporal lobe epileptics who exhibit hyperreligiosity’ (p. 129). These 
provide models of ‘brain correlates of religious experience’ and they are all 
helpful (p. 130). Yet McNamara adds, wisely, ‘we need additional data gather-
ing… and model building efforts in this area’ (p. 130). We also need a stronger 
focus on the precise nature of the relationship, if any, between ‘religious acts’, 
‘religiousness’, ‘religiosity’, ‘hyperreligiosity’ and religious experience.
He argues justifiably that ‘we have no way of knowing, therefore, whether 
the clinical and neuroimaging data are giving us a biased picture of the true 
state of affairs with respect to brain mediation of religiosity’ (p. 130); but it is 
also difficult to see how even a better picture could demonstrate that what is 
true of religiosity in general is also true of religious experience, especially if 
the study is focussed on brain circuitry and function in epileptics. McNamara 
repeats a key point (and a key ambiguity re-emerges): there is a ‘consistent 
set of brain structures that modulate religiosity’ and when these structures 
are ‘chemically addressed’ they may act as a ‘single functional unit’ (p. 130). 
But do they ‘modulate’ ‘religiosity’ in general, ‘mediate’ it in general, or just 
provide evidence of neural correlates of something which may or may not be 
genuinely ‘religious’? There is much to be disentangled.
McNamara turns to the neurochemistry of ‘religiosity’. The ‘religion cir-
cuit’ is regulated by chemicals and the activity of neurochemicals in the brain 
is influenced by a number of things (‘Mind’, emotion, cognition and so on, 
p.137). So ‘it would not be surprising to find that manipulating brain levels of 
selected neurochemicals in selected brain sites would yield religious experi-
ences’ (p. 137). ‘Chemically activating’ this ‘circuit’, then, ‘produces’ (emphasis 
added) religious experiences (in susceptible individuals) that are quite simi-
lar to religious experiences ‘induced by other means such as devotional prac-
tices, ascetical practices, traditional religious practices and so forth’ (p. 137).
Well, it is not clear here that it would be unsurprising. ‘Traditional reli-
gious experiences’ do not seem to be ‘produced’ by chemical activation alone. 
‘Produces’ is quite ambiguous here: one could mean some kind of essential 
causal efficacy or that it is because of chemical activation, amongst other 
things, that religious experience unfolds; or that chemical activation plays a 
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fundamental role in its emergence. Not all who have a ‘religious experience’ 
claim that their ‘religious circuit’ is ‘producing’ it, in the sense of ‘causing’ it; 
there is a fundamental confusion here between some external object that acts 
as a cause (for example, a vision people see or a voice people hear) and some 
internal (neural) circuit that becomes (more) active during this kind of expe-
rience. The question that needs to be addressed here is whether the ‘religious 
circuit’ is ‘producing’ the experience or whether the experience and the cor-
responding activation of the circuit constitute a demonstrative and sufficient 
causal relationship.
Things are made more problematic when one considers that someone 
(whose brain circuits are functioning normally) who has an authentic ‘reli-
gious experience’ would not generally say ‘the chemical activation of a brain 
circuit is producing this religious experience that I am now having’. This 
would sound odd. And they would probably not say: ‘to explain and under-
stand this religious experience that I have had, it is sufficient to explain and 
understand the chemical activation going on inside me at the same time’. This 
too sounds odd. Such utterances would not mean that they are right, but 
would mean rather that an understanding of the whole content of the experi-
ence and its meaning would go well beyond an understanding of images of 
their brain or of neural networks and activity. The conscious, experiential and 
meaning-making dimensions of the experience combined, if it is authentic, 
would tend to take us beyond physical structures, neurons, chemicals, chemi-
cal activation and brain circuits, and talk of only these kinds of things. In the 
case of a genuine religious experience, which we, say, witness with function-
ing imaging technologies, it would also sound odd if that person said: ‘this 
is what I am experiencing now and these are the chemical interactions and 
neural circuits that are producing it’. There is a risk of committing the fallacy 
of composition.
Of course, strictly speaking, they/we cannot always know, and the neuro-
scientist also cannot always know, what a person’s ‘religious circuit’ is doing 
when some religious experiences occur (for example, on a mountain) or what 
the precise nature of the relationship is between activated circuits, chemicals 
and the content of the experience as a whole. If religious experience is, to 
some extent, an experience of something, and if one cannot have an experi-
ence of one’s own ‘religious circuit’ under the influence of chemical activa-
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tion, then it seems perplexing to claim that religious experience is ‘produced’ 
(only or essentially) by mere chemical activation.
The point can be reinforced: if we have a person who has had an au-
thentic religious experience (say, on a mountain in relation to an object, on 
Sunday), and if we could chemically activate their ‘religious circuit’ now, it 
would certainly be surprising to find the same ‘religious experience’ unfold-
ing. This would suggest that there is more to the initial experience than the 
mere conjunction of certain chemicals, neural networks and brain circuits. In 
short, these neurophysiological phenomena would play a role, conceivably, 
but would not be sufficient for us to give a sufficiently comprehensive causal 
account of what is ‘producing’ the experience or what it is that is contributing 
to the emergence of the experience as a whole. The precise nature of this kind 
of causality cannot, strictly speaking, be observed or observed wholly at the 
neural or biochemical level, neither by the neuroscientist nor by the person 
who is having the experience, nor by a witness nearby, when an authentic 
religious experience is taking place, or even when it is being replicated. So, 
the proposition that ‘the chemical activators themselves in conjunction with 
certain brain circuits are “producing” the experience’ seems not only a little 
imprecise, but also genuinely underdetermined.
If all of this is correct the role played by chemical activators becomes 
quite questionable if the focus is on the things that ‘produce’ the experience. 
One could argue that the chemical activators are producing an effect (of some 
kind at the neural level or in a brain circuit) but that effect and the (authentic) 
religious experience need not be one and the same thing. The effect in ques-
tion here is a chemical and physiological one. It presumably accompanies an 
experience (that is to say, when one observes brain or neural circuits in a sub-
ject who is undergoing an authentic religious experience, there is some clear 
evidence of chemical activation taking place though there is no physiological 
evidence at that moment necessarily that the experience is being understood 
in a certain way, for example, as a religious experience rather than as a merely 
irregular one) without a range of external (non-chemical) things (objects, 
phenomena, relations, communication, and so on), coming into play. It is 
therefore difficult to see how we can get from the mere fact of a chemical 
activation to a full-fledged religious experience. If chemical activators alone 
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are sufficient to produce religious experiences, there would presumably be no 
need for such external factors at all.
McNamara offers a ‘provisional model of neurochemical regulation of 
religious experiences’ (p. 143): a religious experience begins with a ‘reduction 
in intentionality or a turning over of the will to God’ (p. 143), this reduction 
is ‘transient in normal religious experiences’; after this reduction or suspen-
sion, ‘images and affects’ follow. Their meaning is grasped and ‘insight and 
gratitude/joy’ occur (p. 143). He ‘contends’ that many religious experiences 
do contain all of these elements, but fails to note that some non-religious 
experiences do too. It may be true that this kind of model can help one ‘link 
religious experiences with brain sites’ and processes, but then again, other 
(non-religious) experiences can also, so long as they are genuine experiences, 
have some sort of ‘reduction in intentionality’, some order of ‘images and 
affects’, some meaning and some insight or joy or gratitude, and so on. The 
elements in the model do seem to be insufficient, and some may be unneces-
sary. Further work needs to be done to produce a more rigorous model and 
a deeper understanding of religious experience and the things that make it 
distinctive.
The reduction in intentionality may have clear neurochemical pathways 
(for example reduced ‘serotoninergic activity in the prefrontal and anterior 
temporal cortices’, p. 143) and the suspension of intentionality may corre-
spond with transient reductions in dopamine activity in prefrontal structures 
‘at the onset of religious experiences’. The task however is not to show that this 
reduction happens in some cases; the task is to show that it happens in cases 
where religious experience begins to occur (p. 144). He contends that when 
the physiological changes are ‘extreme’, the condition ‘mimics psychosis’ (p. 
144). The strangeness of this observation does not attract deep analysis. The 
analogy between psychosis and religious experience is not examined with 
sufficient clarity or rigor; as a consequence a number of questions arise, for 
example, the suggestion that the difference is a question of degree rather than 
of kind is quite problematic. Taken literally, it implies that there is a con-
tinuum between religious experiences and psychosis in so far as these physi-
ological changes are concerned. But it is clear — and McNamara grasps this 
point — that not all who have a religious experience have psychosis. (Cer-
tainly, the analogy is not demonstrated.) This much is clear because psychotic 
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states tend to entail a disjunction between the subject and reality (as we know 
it), and McNamara himself observes the distinction between ‘normal, living 
humans’ (p. 107) and their understanding of reality, on the one hand, and 
psychotic patients and the way in which their understanding of reality differs 
markedly from the understanding of ‘normal, living humans’, on the other 
hand.
Finally, the studies cited by McNamara (from 1975 onwards) often leave 
something to be desired; for example, they often have less than 35 subjects; 
many have less than 10 subjects (hardly a sufficient sample from which to 
draw convincing conclusions about religious experience). Some studies do 
not examine a religious experience at all, or only a meditative state, or listen-
ing to a biblical text or to a ‘religious statement’, or a recollection (for exam-
ple, of a ‘mystical state’); some examine schizophrenia or ‘hyperreligiosity’, or 
prayer. There is some potential for confusion here. There are important phil-
osophical questions that are not really explored: for example, the extent to 
which a subject can believe that they are having a certain kind of experience, 
and say so, and yet be mistaken; or the question of whether the subject’s expe-
rience (and description of it) can be entirely a question of bodies, chemicals, 
(neuro-)physical circuits and structures; and so on. That said though, this is 
an important book and one of the most engaging and thoughtful studies of 
its kind. It is to be hoped that a further volume, in which these questions and 
others can be addressed, will be forthcoming.
